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Rethinking America’s Joint Force: Strength
and Credibility in a Constrained
Fiscal Environment
Wayne Porter
and Mark Mykleby ABSTRACT In today’s constrained fiscal environment, we must ‘‘re-
mission’’ a smaller, more interdependent Joint Force with an emphasis on
capability rather than capacity. America’s military is primarily intended to
defend the nation from attack, prevent and deter war, and when required,
to win decisively in operations ranging from low-end irregular warfare
through high-end conventional warfare. In this century, our nation’s
economic strength, values, and credible influence will play as much a role
in sustaining our security and prosperity as will military power. Working
closely with other departments of the government as well as with partners
and allies, the Department of Defense must rely on three key stakeholders—
Congress, the service chiefs, and the combatant commanders—to shape a
strong and adaptive military. Rather than focusing on traditional ends, ways,
and means, this article addresses the ‘‘concept, form, and function’’ our Joint
Force should pursue in support of the National Security Strategy.
KEYWORDS capability and capacity; Joint Force; national security strategy;
strategic narrative; twenty-first-century military
FOREWORD
In the Spring of 2011, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, led by Jane Harman, hosted their first ‘‘National Conversation,’’
which featured a panel discussion of a paper—‘‘A National Strategic
Narrative by Mr. Y.’’—that had been released by the Wilson Center a few
hours earlier. The distinguished panelists included former National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Princeton professor and former Director of Policy
and Plans at U.S. State Department, Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter (author of the
paper’s Preface), Minnesota Representative Keith Ellison, Pulitzer Prize–
winning columnist Tom Friedman, Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution,
Robert Kagan, and founder of the American Strategy Forum at New American
Foundation, Steve Clemons. ‘‘A National Strategic Narrative’’ was written by
Navy Captain Wayne Porter and Marine Colonel Mark ‘‘Puck’’ Mykleby—then
serving on the staff of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Adm. Mike Mullen; it was
released with the appropriate disclaimers that the views expressed in the
This article not subject to U.S. copyright
law.
The views expressed herein are those of
the authors alone and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Naval
Postgraduate School, the U.S. Navy, the
Department of Defense, or the U.S.
government.
Navy Captain Wayne Porter, USN, was
previously assigned to the Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, serving as a
Special Assistant to the Chairman for
Strategy, and is currently serving as the
Chair for Systemic Strategy and Com-
plexity at the Naval Postgraduate School.
He co-authored with Colonel Mark
Mykleby, ‘‘A National Strategic Narrative’’
(by ‘‘Mr. Y’’) that was published by the
Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars and
subsequently cited in televised editorials
on both CNN and MSNBC.
Marine Colonel Mark ‘‘Puck’’ Mykleby,
USMC (Ret.), served from July 2009 until
April 2011 as a Special Strategic Assistant
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Co-author of ‘‘A National Strategic
Narrative,’’ Colonel Mykleby is now a
Senior Fellow at the New American Foun-
dation, where he continues his work on
grand strategy.
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paper were the authors’ alone and did not reflect the
official policy or position of the U.S. government.
That’s not to say that the concepts in their ‘‘A National
Strategic Narrative’’ did not resonate among many in
and out of official positions.
In ‘‘A National Strategic Narrative,’’ Captain Porter
and Colonel Mykleby contended that, as Americans,
we must approach our enduring national interests—
prosperity and security—through the sustainable
application of credible influence and strength within
the boundaries of our national values. They believe
that to do this we must invest in education to reinvig-
orate America’s competitiveness, innovation, and
entrepreneurial drive. They argued that it’s time to
move the nation from a cold war strategy of contain-
ment to a strategy of sustainability designed to
secure our enduring interests in a dynamic strategic
environment. The paper spoke of the congruity,
complementarity, and synergy of our domestic and
foreign policies; it also discussed the need for ‘‘smart
growth’’ at home and ‘‘smart power’’ abroad. Growth
at home and power abroad will build the national
strength we need to compete globally and the cred-
ible influence we need to sustain our leadership
worldwide. Porter and Mykleby contended that the
tools of development, diplomacy, and defense need
to be used functionally through the flexible and agile
application of public, private, and civil sector
resources rather than organizationally through the
inflexible and discrete channels of government.
Their intent with the ‘‘Narrative’’ was to help frame
our national policy discussions and decisions about
investment, security, economic development,
energy, the environment, and engagement well into
this century. One goal was to look beyond risk and
threat—using a more positive focus on converging
interests and opportunities.
In January of this year, the President signed a
Department of Defense document entitled, ‘‘Sustain-
ing Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense.’’ This strategic guidance recognizes that
the challenges of this century cannot be met by the
military alone but, rather, must be addressed by
strengthening all tools of American power, including
diplomacy and development, intelligence, and
homeland security. While recognizing our con-
strained fiscal environment, the President pledges
to ensure that our armed forces remain ‘‘the best
trained, best led, and best equipped’’ in the world.
In their new paper: ‘‘Rethinking America’s Joint
Force: Strength and Credibility in a Constrained
Fiscal Environment,’’ Porter and Mykleby offer a time-
phased, prioritized approach to doing just that—by
attempting to understand the concept, form, and
function our twenty-first-century military should pur-
sue in support of the national security strategy. They
recognize the military’s role in the three integrated
national strategies of defense, diplomacy, and devel-
opment. Further, they attempt to explain the roles
and responsibilities of three key stakeholders—
Congress, the service chiefs, and the combatant
commanders—in shaping a strong and agile military.
This paper is the military instantiation of their
National Strategic Narrative. While many may not
agree with every aspect, Captain Porter and Colonel




A NEW JOINT FORCE
As noted in the President’s National Security Strat-
egy, in the Defense Secretary’s strategic guidance for
2012,1 and in ‘‘A National Strategic Narrative,’’2 our
enduring national interests—prosperity and security—
and our leadership role on the world stage are under-
pinned and bounded by liberty and the values that
have characterized us as Americans since the found-
ing of our Republic. But the complexity, competition,
and interconnectedness of a new century require a
fresh perspective on how best to secure these endur-
ing interests—our current path is simply unsustain-
able. The time has come for our military to evolve
from a strategy based on containment to a strategy
focused on the sustainability of our security and pros-
perity in a dynamic and uncertain strategic environ-
ment. To accomplish this, we will need to apply
credible influence and strength through a balanced
Joint Force integrated within a flexible interagency
construct and interoperable with international
partners—a Joint Force with the agility to rapidly
transition from low-end to high-end missions when
directed to do so by our commander in chief.
While our near-term priority is to succeed in our
ongoing campaign in Afghanistan and against the
shadowy networks of crime and extremism that pro-
mote mayhem, fear, and oppression worldwide, we
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must reconstitute our strategic depth by developing
the right capabilities and capacity to balance risk
and opportunities in the mid- to long term. Over
time, the best way to shape the force of the future
is to invest in the science, technology, education,
and training that will equip our soldiers, sailors, air-
men, and marines to adapt to an increasingly com-
plex and dynamic environment. The hardware and
software we buy and build are secondary to the gray
matter we must cultivate now.
Our goal is to provide the nation with the
most flexible and agile military force possible with
which to pursue and safeguard our enduring
national interests while concurrently sustaining a
leadership role for the United States in the greater
world order.
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
As noted in ‘‘A National Strategic Narrative,’’ secur-
ity is a state of mind as much as it is a physical aspect
of our environment. ‘‘For Americans, security is very
closely related to freedom, because security repre-
sents freedom from anxiety and external threat, free-
dom from disease and poverty, freedom from tyranny
and oppression, freedom of choice and expression,
and also freedom from hurtful ideologies, prejudice,
and violations of human rights.’’3 Our military’s role
since we gained independence has been to safeguard
that freedom and guarantee that security while
remaining true to the values set forth by our
Founding Fathers. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines are trusted to demonstrate those values—
integrity, duty, honor, courage, commitment, fidelity,
respect, and discipline—every day, at home and
wherever they serve around the world.
But the tools of defense are only part of what must be
employed in pursuit of security. The responsibility for
safeguarding our nation does not reside within one
government department alone, or even one sector of
society, any more than do the values we cherish or the
tools of diplomacy and development. In fact, if these
values and tools are not employed collectively within
the context of a coherent national strategy, versus being
narrowly applied in isolation to individual countries or
regions, they will fail to achieve a sustainable result.4
Security cannot be safeguarded by borders or natural
barriers; freedom cannot be secured with locks or by
force alone. In our complex, interdependent, and con-
stantly changing global environment, security is not
achievable for one nation or by one people; rather, it
must be recognized as a common interest and goal of
all peoples. Otherwise, security is not sustainable and,
without it, peace of mind is impossible.5
Prosperity without security is unsustainable, just as
security cannot be sustained without prosperity.
The most obvious example of this linkage is the
impact national economies have on the pursuit and
development of military capability and capacity. As
nations gain economic stability and prominence in
the world market, they are more inclined to increase
their defense spending as they seek the means to
secure not only their homeland but access to
resources and markets that will help to sustain the
growth of their economies. History has demonstrated
that this can also lead to dangerous military adven-
turism. Conversely, other nations may scale back
security-related expenditures as their economies
slow or weaken, seeking instead to rely more heavily
on stronger partners. We cannot isolate our own
security from the global system. As we seek to main-
tain and expand our own prosperity, the welfare of
our citizens must be viewed as part of a highly
dynamic and interconnected system that includes
sovereign nations, world markets, natural and man-
generated challenges and solutions—a system that
demands adaptability and innovation.
When we speak of the ‘‘international order,’’ ‘‘world
markets,’’ and the ‘‘global system,’’ we are discussing a
complex and interdependent system of systems—a
sort of ‘‘strategic ecology’’—affected by powerful
trends that are the result of conditions left unchecked
for many years. These trends include the decline of
rural economies, joblessness, the dramatic increase
in urbanization, an increasing demand for energy,
migration of populations and shifting demographics,
the rise of gray and black markets, the phenomenon
of extremism and antimodernism, the effects of global
climate change, the spread of pandemics and lack of
access to adequate health services, and an increasing
access to, and dependency on, cybernetworks.
All of these trends affect our security and prosperity,
and they are exacerbated by the accelerating dynamics
of global power structures, transformative technolo-
gies and their application to warfare, the near-
instantaneous accessibility of information, and the
pervasive explosion of social networking. These global
trends, whether manifesting themselves in Africa, the
Middle East, Asia, Eurasia, South America, or within
our own hemisphere, impact the lives of Americans
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in ways that are often obscure as they spread over vast
areas with cascading and sometimes catastrophic
effect. But these trends also represent opportunities.
We cannot pretend that greed, corruption, ancient hatreds,
and newborn apprehensions won’t continue, over time, to
transform into very real risks that could threaten our
national interests and test our values. We must recognize
this as an inevitable part of the strategic environment and
continue to maintain the flexibility and agility that will allow
us to minimize, deter, or defeat those with diverging or con-
flicting interests that threaten our security. At the same time,
we must never lose sight of opportunities to shape a better
future. This calls for an adaptable, robust, technologically
superior military—equally capable of responding to
low-end, irregular conflicts and to high-end, conventional
contingency operations and asymmetric threats.6
Thus, we must consider not only the ends, ways, and
means of our long-term military strategy but also be
certain that we understand the role of the Joint Force
in the larger context of concept, form, and function.
CONCEPT, FORM, AND FUNCTION
Flexibility, agility, adaptability, innovation, and
trust are the building blocks that must be present
and in use throughout the Total Joint Force—in
concert with a more vibrant interagency and whole-
of-nation approach to sustainable security and pros-
perity and to renewing U.S. leadership. While we
certainly must carefully consider ends, ways, and
means in our planning process, we cannot allow
doctrine to become a substitute for, or to obscure,
critical and imaginative thinking. That is the essence
of ‘‘smart power.’’ Conceptually, we must ensure that
our long-term military strategy complements and
expands upon the strategic forms described in the
National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense
Review, and the 2012 Department of Defense
strategic guidance entitled, Sustaining Global
Leadership: Priorities for a 21st Century Defense.
We will be safeguarding our security and prosperity
through strength and influence by recognizing the
value in Joint, interagency, whole-of-government,
and multinational interconnectedness, and by func-
tionally applying development, diplomacy, and
defense across the spectrum of conflict, transnational
crime, and humanitarian crises (see Figure 1).
Within this context, the concept of our long-term
military strategy is to deliver to the nation a flexible
and agile force that can support the renewal of
America’s leadership role. Such leadership must be
consistent with the direction provided in the
National Security Strategy and must aim to achieve
our national security objectives and meet the priori-
ties delineated in the Quadrennial Defense Review
and strategic guidance cited earlier.
The form this takes will be shaped by our require-
ment to achieve the proper force balance to address
future challenges within an interservice, interagency,
and international framework. This force balance is
largely determined by the three key stakeholders
shown in the diagram below: our Congress, our
services chiefs, and our combatant commanders.
Congress provides for the procurement of capability
and capacity that results in force balance and
flexibility. Congress also determines the authorities
that shape our services and hold us accountable for
the manner in which our Joint Force interacts with
FIGURE 1 Concept, form, and function (color figure available
online).
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other government agencies, nations, organizations,
and the private sector. Our service chiefs provide
for the force composition, balance, and training—
the flexibility—required to meet the demands of
every mission, whenever and wherever that force is
needed. Our combatant commanders provide the
President with the options he needs to execute U.S.
policy through credible influence and strength. They
must be able to put in place and move those forces
with agility whenever ordered to do so by the Presi-
dent (see Figure 2).
The function of our long-term military strategy is
to provide vision, to identify challenges and
solutions in the strategic environment, and to set
priorities, based on foreseeable constraints and
acceptable risk, that will allow our military leader-
ship to execute the orders of the President whenever
and wherever necessary in keeping with the con-
cepts cited in the National Security Strategy.
CONSTRAINTS, RISKS, AND
PRIORITIES
A strategy that assumes unlimited resources is
merely an academic exercise. Having identified a
vision and some of the global trends that will con-
tinue to shape our strategic environment throughout
this century, we must identify the constraints and
risks that necessarily force the prioritization of our
planning.
These constraints include an economy already
heavily burdened with debt, in which the Department
of Defense is likely to be asked to share some pro-
portion of its budget with other departments and
agencies. Fiscal constraints will significantly affect
end strength and entitlements, equipment procure-
ment and modernization, recruiting and training,
force readiness and employment, and force balance
and basing. But other constraints beyond cost of
the force are present. Part of our agility—the ability
to more effectively interact with and share responsi-
bilities and resources with other government
departments and agencies (e.g., State, Homeland
Security, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Transpor-
tation, Energy)—is determined by U.S. law and code.
As we seek more effective, whole-of-nation means to
sustain security and prosperity, Congress may choose
to review the authorities that govern shared
resources, begin taking a more functional approach
to diplomacy, development, and defense, and allow
greater movement of funds across departments. In
the complex strategic environment of the twenty-first
century, the Department of Defense will need to be
far more integrated within the interagency than ever
before.
Further constraints may include our partners’ sen-
sitivities to a U.S. military footprint abroad, the need
to reduce the deployment time of our forces, the
high cost of energy, and maintaining our commit-
ment to fully support an all-volunteer force—a force
our nation expects and deserves. Our long-term
challenge is to wrest from this very complex calculus
sustainable solutions and the tools necessary for suc-
cess. Likewise, the flexibility and agility of our future
force will largely be determined not only through
force balance, capacity, and capability but by recog-
nizing our role within the interagency structure and
within the larger international order.
Perhaps our greatest challenge is dealing with
uncertainty. Uncertainty defines our strategic
environment—and that brings to mind risk. Our
military strategy cannot be limited to addressing only
near-term priorities—we must begin now to lay the
groundwork for a more effective force in the future.
Accordingly, we must also look beyond immediate
threats and carefully consider what risks we are will-
ing to assume in the mid- and long term. This is
where uncertainty complicates our planning and
analysis and forces us to make hard decisions. Rather
than allowing risk to drive these decisions, we need
to accept risk where we can and move on.
FIGURE 2 Three key stakeholders (color figure available
online).
Volume 34, Number 2, 2012 61
In the near term, we have already accepted risk in
several areas. We have essentially shifted the focus of
our force toward low-end conflicts, counterinsur-
gency operations, stabilization, reconstruction and
training, and irregular warfare in our campaign in
Afghanistan and in confronting violent extremism.
In so doing, we have accepted some risk in high-
end, state-on-state, conventional warfare. We have
accepted open-ended risk because of concern for
the welfare of our military families—minimizing
repeated combat deployments and deployments to
other high-stress environments. In taking on many
nontraditional aspects of reconstruction and stabili-
zation in Afghanistan and Iraq, we accepted the risk
that our credibility as a conventional fighting force
would not be eroded. We decided that responding
to humanitarian crises and demonstrating restraint
in our counterinsurgency operations took prece-
dence and that we would risk the perception (not
the reality) that our fighting forces and fighting spirit
had diminished and that the deterrent effect of our
military’s overwhelming advantage in fighting capa-
bility and capacity would be lessened.
These are risks we have had to accept in our current
fight. But there are further risks in the mid- and long
term that we cannot accept as we seek to carefully
reset our priorities. One risk is that by overfocusing
on today’s threat environment, we will fail to prepare
our forces for tomorrow’s challenges. Another risk
is overcompensating as we seek to rebalance. Still
another is the long-term risk of having our current
force balance be too centered on irregular warfare,
while the threat from ideologically motivated, socio-
pathic mayhem becomes unsustainable over time. Fis-
cal pressure could cause us to question the social
contract we have made and the obligations we have
to our military families; in so doing, we could break
a solemn commitment and lose the faith of the
American people. Our focus on force protection
brings the risk of possibly distancing our military
families from full participation in and social integra-
tion into American communities at home and from
sharing experiences with diverse cultural communities
abroad. There is a risk that having our military services
continue to shoulder a greater burden of develop-
ment and diplomacy than departments better suited
to fulfilling these functional areas will cause service
members to become less integrated into and more
alienated from the rest of our national institutions.
CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY
The spectrum of conflict and crisis management
runs from high-end, nuclear confrontation to low-
end humanitarian disasters and relief efforts, with
the likelihood of U.S. involvement running from
low probability (in the case of high-end confron-
tation) to high probability (for continued involve-
ment in humanitarian assistance and partner
building). It is useful to consider this spectrum in
terms of capability and capacity to help best
determine where the U.S. Joint Force, interagency
departments, the private sector, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and international partners
can be most effective in establishing ongoing secur-
ity and stability. In the middle of this spectrum falls
a range of activities from irregular to conventional
warfare. Clearly, this is where the main Joint Force
effort needs to be in the future—core competencies
that range from expeditionary warfare to strategic
deterrence and decisive action. Within this space,
our services must develop complete Joint Force
interoperability built on unique and interdependent
service capabilities, roles, and responsibilities.
A convenient way to consider force balance across
the spectrum of conflict is in terms of capability and
capacity. Economic strength and military capability
are critical to deter and to counter the threat in
the low-probability=high-end conventional warfare
quadrant; on the other hand, capacity in terms of
personnel, systems, and dwell time is predominant
in the high-probability=low-end quadrant. This leads
to the conclusion that, in the future, our military
should plan on assuming risk more in the low-end
quadrant where development, humanitarian assist-
ance, and disaster relief operations can—with the
proper relationships and authorities—be shared
among other U.S. departments, NGOs, international
organizations, and partner nations’ militaries (see
Figure 3).
Consequently, our Joint Force should be prepared
to place more emphasis on developing the proper
capabilities and capacity that will allow us to prevent
and deter, prevail, and prepare to defeat in opera-
tions ranging from low-end irregular warfare through
high-end conventional warfare. This argues for a
balanced and expeditionary force at the low end
and a decisive and deterrent force at the high end.
A large part of this high-end capability will come
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from technological and innovative dominance versus
numeric superiority of personnel and equipment. At
the low end, we will need the capacity to aggregate
forces for expeditionary warfare and to disaggregate
to provide rapid response to regional threats, theater
security engagement, support for noncombatant
evacuation operations, and limited humanitarian
assistance as required. But, wherever we employ
our Joint Force in the spectrum of conflict, crime,
and crisis, our nation’s economic strength, values,
and credible influence will play as much a role in
sustaining our prosperity and security as will military
power.
NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES (2 YEARS)
Defend the United States
In defense of the homeland and our interests
abroad, including the threat from weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and cyberattack, the Joint Force
will be as flexible as possible within the law, sup-
porting interagency, law enforcement, international,
nongovernmental, and private sector efforts to coun-
ter transnational terrorism, crime, and the effects of
natural and human-generated disasters.
Accomplish Today’s Missions
The reality is that our course for the next two
years has largely been set. We will remain focused
on continuing the transition of security responsibility
in Iraq to the Iraqis and build on our investment
of blood and treasure to craft a sustainable partner-
ship. In Afghanistan, we will remain focused on
successfully meeting our military objectives while
setting the conditions there for a more stable
partnership in the war against violent extremism.
Likewise, we will continue to strengthen our relation-
ship with Pakistan, India, and other partners
throughout the region to demonstrate our commit-
ment to a more stable and secure South Asia and
broader Middle East.
The threat from violent extremism cannot be con-
sidered to be geographically defined or to be simply
an organizational problem. Recognizing this threat as
a complex and adaptive network with tangible
objectives and inherent weaknesses, rather than
focusing solely on the tactics of its operations (indi-
vidual acts of terrorism and combat), requires a
much broader and more focused global effort. The
unique aspects of radical and violent Islamism must
be countered with the help of the global Muslim
community. Hateful ideologies cannot be destroyed,
but violent extremists can be discredited and ren-
dered irrelevant. What is required is persistent
patience and remembering that any ideology that
promotes fear and lethal attacks against innocents
is ultimately unsustainable.
The vast majority, although not all, of the tools
required to discredit and defeat an enemy depen-
dent on asymmetric tactics and a theocratic strategic
campaign are nonmilitary and non-kinetic. Our
national power must be used more broadly to fos-
ter education, human rights, humanitarian assist-
ance, economics, religious dialogue, science and
technology, and cultural awareness. In a world
where a bullet can create more enemies than it
eliminates and a classroom full of women can
pacify a province, a broader understanding of our
national power and how we deploy and use it is
required.
Deterrence and Decisive Action
Even as we reduce the role of nuclear weapons in
our arsenal in accordance with the Nuclear Posture
Review Report 2010 and the New START Treaty,
and actively pursue counterproliferation, we will
maintain a prudent nuclear deterrence and robust
ballistic missile defense at home and abroad.
FIGURE 3 Spectrum of conflict, crime, crises (color figure
available online).
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We will provide the President with options should
international efforts to deter Iran from developing a
nuclear weapons capability fail, and we will actively
seek to expose and diminish malign Iranian influ-
ence in the Gulf, Afghanistan, and the Levant.
Likewise, we will remain alert and ready to take
decisive action in response to further provocation
from, or significant instability in, North Korea even
as we begin to transition the security lead on the
peninsula to the Republic of South Korea. In Asia
and the Pacific, we will begin to rebuild strong
relationships that encourage human rights while
providing an environment for further economic
development and growth.
Partner Building
Our Theater Security Cooperation Program and
other military-to-military engagements will remain
critical as we seek to improve partner capability
and interoperability. This will require maximum
flexibility in aggressively pursuing reform in the
security sector. During this period, we will continue
efforts to improve the capability and interoperability
of our own interagency, NGOs, and the private sec-
tor, so that one day the U.S. Joint Force may function
in support of, rather than leading, international
humanitarian assistance missions, thus freeing some
military capacity for more traditional military roles.
Commitment to the Military Family
Recognizing that operational tempo will remain
high in the near term, we will mitigate related family
and service member distress by demonstrating our
commitment to honor all entitlements (including
access to appropriate health care, preventive medi-
cine, employment, and education), just as our service
members and their families have honored their
commitment to the nation. For those who choose
to separate from the active military, we will explore
opportunities for a continuum of service through
the Reserve or other government agencies and
address any gaps that exist in the transition from
active duty to veteran status. We will improve sup-
port to families who have lost loved ones in the
active duty and reserve components, providing pro-
grams that help families cope with the loss of loved
ones in the line of duty.
Energy and Environmental
Awareness
It is time for the U.S. military to seize the initiative
as a champion for clean and sustainable energy, as
well as for solutions to the second- and third-order
effects CO2 emissions and climbing oil prices are
having on the strategic environment. The Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) is the single largest energy
consumer in the United States (approximately 78
percent of the federal sector, with 536 installations
on 29.8 million acres worldwide); the United States
is the largest energy consumer in the world. While
each of the services has already undertaken laudable
alternative energy initiatives, including the Navy’s
Green Fleet, bringing these together under a sweep-
ing unified effort would greatly compound the
Department’s savings and progress toward energy
sustainability. Finding a source of clean and renew-
able energy is this century’s great challenge; the sol-
ution or solutions will be as liberating, far-reaching,
and empowering as was the Advanced Research Pro-
ject Agency-Network (ARPA-net) in spawning the
information age. The pursuit of solutions to this chal-
lenge will necessarily address access to existing
sources of energy and the development of clean,
affordable, and renewable alternatives, the miti-
gation of the effects of high carbon emissions on
the climate and our environment as well as the
effects of climate change on shifting demographics
and global markets, and the ability to counter the
spread of extremism as a second-order byproduct
of energy-disenfranchised cultures. By leveraging
organizations like the Defense Advanced Research
Project Agency (DARPA), service institutions like
the Naval Postgraduate School (where a renewable
energy curriculum is already being implemented),
and cooperation with advanced civilian laboratories
and the commercial sector, the military will play a
key role in advancing the nation’s vital interests well
into this century.
MID-TERM PRIORITIES (2–7 YEARS)
Begin Transition to Sustainability
In the mid-term, we will begin to take posi-
tive steps toward a more sustainable, flexible, and
agile Joint Force that is well-integrated with other
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government agencies and interoperable with a var-
iety of international partners—a Joint Force that is
manned, trained, and equipped to operate in uncer-
tain environments ranging from expeditionary,
low-end irregular war to decisive action in high-end
conflict. The transition from a strategy of contain-
ment to a strategy of sustainability will go beyond
simply resetting the Joint Force—it will require the
cooperation of Congress, the service chiefs, and the
combatant commanders. While we expect the DoD
to be working in an austere economic environment
in which a greater proportion of the national budget
is being shared among agencies, we also expect Con-
gress to have addressed constrictive authorities and
processes to allow for more interaction and sharing
of funds between the DoD and other departments.
Such interaction and fund sharing should level the
load across functional areas of diplomacy, develop-
ment, and defense.
To achieve the proper balance and force readiness
required to provide the President with the capability
and capacity to execute a range of options, three
aspects of our strategy must be addressed: our force,
our people, and our posture. Each of these requires
transformative innovation, ingenuity, and vision if
we are to maintain our global leadership role and
competitive edge. They will also require a strong
economy and the continued support of the American
people, further evidence of the linkage between
prosperity and security.
Our Force
To reset the Joint Force, we must address head-on
any gaps or duplication of effort that exist as a result
of parochialism or redundancy among services.
Operating as a Joint Force does not mean abandon-
ing service-specific roles and responsibilities—to the
contrary, efficiency requires clear delineation of ser-
vice lanes in the road as well as interoperability and
interdependency among them. The Army and Air
Force, supported by the Navy, will need to focus pri-
marily on conventional deterrence and decisive
action. The Marines and Navy, supported by the
Army and Air Force, will need to deliver expedition-
ary capability and capacity for irregular warfare.
Special Operations Forces will engage in tailored
missions ranging from low-end partner building
and security force assistance to countering the
proliferation and use of WMD. Our Intelligence, Sur-
veillance, Reconnaissance capabilities and capacity
must be matched by automated processing and
analysis that can synthesize great volumes of infor-
mation in near–real time for decision makers.
Further, unmanned platforms will play a larger role
in all aspects of war; our command and control will
need to be survivable and resilient. As has been sta-
ted, the entire Joint Force will also need to be more
interoperable and integrated with other elements of
national influence and international coalitions.
To properly equip the force of the future to deter
or win high-end conflicts in complex and adaptive
environments requires a much more dynamic pro-
curement process. Such procurement process must
be able to design, build, and deliver at the speed
of modern war as well as the accelerating rate of
technological advancement. System-build cycles that
exceed five years will not provide our force with the
flexibility to stay ahead of the threat. A revolution-
ized process of developing, manufacturing, and
fielding new weapons systems—such as the DARPA
Adaptive Make initiative7—would dramatically
improve the capability and capacity of our force.
The Department of Defense can and must be a lead-
ing supporter and consumer of high-technology
innovation and creative thinking, including the
means to reduce our dependency on fossil fuels
and to increase the resiliency of our infrastructure
and bases to hedge against the effects of climate
change and the threat of asymmetric attack.
To maintain a more dependable force, and to
shape a less energy-competitive environment, the
Department of Defense must continue to work
closely with academic and commercial research part-
ners to develop sustainable and reliable sources of
clean energy. Just as we have outpaced the adequacy
of sail, carbon-fired steam, and petrochemical-based
fuels over the past two centuries, so too must we
now recognize the benefits inherent in developing
more sustainable sources of energy to fuel our
economy and our military.
Our People
In a constrained fiscal environment, tough deci-
sions that balance end-strength (both capacity and
capability) with entitlements will need to be made.
By sharing responsibility at the low end of the
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spectrum with interagency and international part-
ners, we will trim some of our required capacity. In
terms of capability, one of our highest priorities is
to invest in innovative and critical thinking—the cog-
nitive, technological, and linguistic tools our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines will need to apply at the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels. We must
foster the mental, physical, and moral strength,
adaptability, and resilience they need to overcome
challenges and to anticipate, recognize, and seize
opportunities. This requires a commitment that
extends from education and professional training,
to family readiness and support, and beyond separ-
ation to post-military opportunities or retirement.
Assured access to the capacity and unique skills
available through our Reserve and Guard programs
will remain a critical element of our Total Force
(active and reserve components) as part of our oper-
ational and strategic reserve. Additionally, we need
to be more savvy about and adept at managing
contracted services. Creativity will be required to
ensure a sustainable quality of service for our
military families without sacrificing the capacity to
fulfill our missions. By helping each service member
plan and provide for financial stability, professional
growth, and family well-being, we can sustain the
right balance without jeopardizing our all-volunteer
force.
Our Posture
Our force posture, at home and abroad, says much
about our national security strategy, our military
strategy, and U.S. policy. In many ways, it’s where
the ‘‘say-do gap’’ has to be closed. Strength is about
much more than military power, with many compo-
nents of strength equally important to our nation’s
credible influence—strength of character, resilience,
and compassion. One of the surest indications of real
strength is restraint—only the weak seek to intimi-
date. Our military and economic strength provide
us a voice, but what truly speaks of our character
as a nation is the resolve to use these in a manner
consistent with our values. This resolve forms the
basis of our force posture.
The credibility of our military is determined by the
world’s perception of our commitment and resolve
as much as it is by our overwhelming capabilities
and capacity. We must maintain forward presence
even while we are sensitive to our footprint abroad,
continuously demonstrating the expeditionary flexi-
bility of our force. Our Army and Air Force provide
a strong presence through regular military-to-military
engagement and combined operations globally,
while our Navy–Marine Corps team continues to
demonstrate additional flexibility with our Partner-
ship Stations, Carrier Strike Group, and Expedition-
ary Strike Group deployments. This presence is
proof of our commitment to be a force for good—
focused on building partner capacity and keeping
the so-called global commons open and free—and
is a constant reminder of the awesome power that
is always available to support our international part-
ners. The same is true of our forward bases.
For decades we have maintained forward bases
worldwide. Increasingly, though, these bases have
elicited mixed reactions from the citizens of our host
nations. Some have brought pressure on their gov-
ernments to remove our bases, others have actively
sought an increased U.S. presence. What is very
clear is that we have much to offer to one another
if we can get the balance of partnership and protec-
tion right. This is a second-order effect of the
dynamic relationship between prosperity and secur-
ity. By assuming some risk in the area of con-
venience and hardened force protection, we might
better integrate our military families into local host
nation economies and cultures. This could include
quotas in DoD schools for children of the host
nation, less dependence on U.S. commissary and
exchange services, and more fiscally sound housing
policies. The better integrated our military families
can become in host nation economies and cul-
tures—as well as within our own communities at
home—the more trust will develop. But trust also
comes from commitment and the resolve to use
our strength wisely for common benefit. Much of
this has to do with deterrence.
Deterrence and countering the proliferation of
WMD and the threat of catastrophic attack, in the tru-
est sense, are built on military and economic strength
and credibility; they cannot be achieved through
intimidation and threat alone. For deterrence to be
effective, it must leverage converging interests and
interconnectedness, while differentiating and
addressing diverging and conflicting interests that
represent potential threats. Limiting our discussions
of counterproliferation to the physical dimensions of
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the problem (spread of WMD or cyberattack, conse-
quence management, detection capabilities) pre-
vents us from recognizing a broader and more
relevant context.
The pace and complex nature of technology
development and dissemination could eventually
outrun our ability to physically control materials
and actors, let alone respond effectively in all sec-
tors in which American interests reside. The desire
to acquire and employ WMD (or to anonymously
employ offensive cyber-operations) is an intrinsic
issue of motivation and behavior that reflects the
systemic logic of how our adversaries perceive
and interpret the environment around them and
U.S. resolve to prevent the spread of WMD or
cyber-mischief. The physical efforts of defending
against material proliferation and potential attacks
will buy us the time we need to establish an endur-
ing counternarrative of credibility, strength, and
influence that will render the ideological foundation
of our adversaries indefensible and irrelevant. This
approach, though, will require further investment
in nuclear, biological, chemical, and cyber forensics
and clear policy redlines for measured response.
Our Air Force, Army, and Strategic Forces have the
lead.
LONG-TERM PRIORITIES (>7 YEARS)
A Flexible, Agile, and
Adaptable Force
Safeguarding the sustainability of our nation’s
prosperity and security as a leader among nations,
while remaining true to the values that characterize
us as Americans, calls for a robust, technologically
superior, disciplined, and agile military—equally
capable of responding to low-end, irregular conflicts
and to major conventional contingency operations.
But sustaining prosperity and security also requires
a strong and unshakable economy, more diverse
and deployable instruments of national influence,
and a well-informed and supportive citizenry. We
must remain committed to a whole-of-nation
approach to development, diplomacy, and defense.
Our ability to look beyond risk and threat—to
accept them as realities—and to focus on opportu-
nities and converging interests will determine if
we succeed in pursuing our national interests in a
sustainable manner while maintaining our national
values. This requires confidence in our capabilities
as a military and as a nation.
Let the honor and courage of our men and women
in uniform, and their families, inspire that confidence
and the same sense of commitment within and from
all Americans.
Building on the groundwork we established in our
mid-term priorities, our Joint Force will have the
proper authorities and procurement processes, force
posture, and personnel to adapt in the uncertain and
complex strategic environment of this century. Our
infrastructure, bases, and deployed forces will be less
dependent on nonrenewable sources of energy and
more responsive to and resilient in the face of asym-
metric threats and the effects of global climate
change. We will have begun to better integrate our
military families into local communities both at home
and abroad to increase our understanding of diverse
cultures and peoples; our forward presence and
interoperability with regional militaries will under-
score our commitment to maintain freedom of access
to the global commons and to help secure scarce
sources of food, water, and energy. Our techno-
logical and innovation dominance will provide a
deterrent edge in high-end conflict, while our
people-centric, expeditionary capacity will provide
the agility necessary to prevent conflict or win irregu-
lar warfare.
Over the next seven to fifteen years—as part of
an integrated, whole-of-nation and international
effort—the focus of our military will be on positively
influencing the global trends that will shape the
environment for this century and on providing an
unshakable hedge against the threats that will inevi-
tably develop. By investing in education and tech-
nology that inspires and supports critical thinking
and innovation, we can sustain a sufficiently adapta-
ble force to provide the President, and the nation,
with the right capabilities and capacity. This vision
for our twenty-first-century military is intended to
provide the direction necessary to embrace this chal-
lenge now for a more sustainable, prosperous, and
secure future.
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